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Abstract 
Whether conditions of worth theory can explain complex forms of human psychological 
distress, such as those emanating from early experiences of abuse, neglect and trauma, 
alongside experiences of physiological events later in life is open to debate. It has been 
suggested that Rogers’s personality theory should be reconsidered and replaced with an 
actualization-centered formulation that places greater emphasis on the enhancement of self, 
process and agency through relationship, rather than on a theory of defense. This paper aims 
to examine these proposals and consider their relative contribution to developing the theory 
of personality. We suggest that the actualization-centered process theory aids Rogers’s theory 
of personality but is not an adequate replacement. We also consider the issues associated with 
maintaining theoretical and practical symmetry, and the practice implications of replacing 
conditions of worth1. 
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Introduction 
            In this paper we examine the theoretical concepts of processing (Warner, 2000) and 
conditions of worth (Rogers, 1959). Over the last fifteen years there has been a gradual yet 
hitherto unchallenged integration of the concept of processing styles (Warner, 2000, 2002, 
2008, 2009) into person-centered theory (Sanders 2004; Mearns and Thorne 2007; Pearce & 
Sommerbeck 2014). This was based on the claim that the concept of processing styles 
provides an alternate and more complete personality theory to that of conditions of worth 
(Warner, 2009). We agree that if person-centered and experiential therapies are to continue to 
thrive then new developments in theory are to be welcomed. However, in order for new 
theoretical ideas to replace existing ones they need to meet certain requirements. For 
instance, new theoretical developments need to demonstrate that the existing theory does not 
provide a sufficient explanation for an observed phenomenon or the new theory is able to 
provide a more parsimonious account. The processing styles theory was based on the claim 
that conditions of worth theory was not sufficient to explain a number of observable 
phenomena; however, before the new theoretical development can be fully accepted this 
hypothesis on which it is based needs to be put to the test. Theories need to have internal 
consistency, be parsimonious, have coherency, and be broadly applicable. If the theory of 
conditions of worth is not sufficiently broadly applicable then the theory rightly needs to be 
expanded and refined in order to make it more broadly applicable and able to include 
observed phenomena that are relevant to the field.  
The primary aim of this paper is to examine the validity and basis for the claim that 
conditions of worth theory is inadequate for explaining complex forms of human 
psychological distress. Firstly, to put this to the test we outline the basic theory underpinning 
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conditions of worth. We will argue there is insufficient evidence to warrant the claim that 
conditions of worth theory has insufficient explanatory power. Contrary to the claimed need 
to replace conditions of worth theory we will illustrate that conditions of worth are both 
inextricably linked to processing theory and are implicit in all aspects of personality 
formation from the Rogerian perspective. We shall propose that conditions of worth theory 
provides a useful explanation for the deep structures formed within personalities, that relate 
to the very cognitive-affective system used to process information, experience and memory. 
To do this we address three hypothetical scenarios originally proposed by Warner (2009) as 
beyond the explanatory reach of conditions of worth theory. Following this we consider the 
issue of maintaining symmetry between theory and practice, and the implications for person-
centered practice of integrating processing styles, which can be perceived as inherently 
diagnostic, into a theory of conditions of worth, which is universal. To end we assert the 
claim that conditions of worth theory cannot be dismissed, replaced or watered down in our 
understanding of personality formation and change but that conditions of worth and 
processing theories can be considered complementary to one another. Further theoretical 
development work will be useful to assist our understanding in this area together with 
empirical investigations of the links between conditions of worth and processing capacities. 
 Conditions of Worth 
All major approaches to psychotherapy are based on a theory of personality. The 
practice of person-centered therapy is based on the theory of personality proposed by Rogers 
(1951; 1959). Conditions of worth form a crucial part within the theory of personality. The 
term conditions of worth was initially presented and described as the introjected value 
(Rogers 1951) and was later developed by Standal (1954). As a result the term the introjected 
value was subsequently renamed within the theory as condition of worth and since then has 
been the main terminology for understanding those aspects of the personality that shape our 
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sense of our own worth. Rogers deemed conditions of worth to be a more exact term for the 
observed phenomena that people seemed to take on the values of others and behave in a way 
as if the introjected value was their own (Rogers, 1959). Conditions of worth are formed 
when a person receives conditional positive regard from a significant social other that 
communicates to them that parts of their experience are more or less worthy of positive 
regard than others. A condition of worth is formed when the person assimilates this external 
valuing of their experience into the self-concept. The person gradually moves towards 
holding the same introjected conditional attitude toward themselves; losing and gaining self-
regard, avoiding and seeking certain experiences, based on external valuations rather than 
based on whether the experience enhances or fails to enhance their organism (Rogers, 1959).  
This developmental process represents an ‘important specific instance of inaccurate 
symbolization’ (Rogers 1959, p. 210) as the person may value experience as if in relation to 
their actualization tendency, and perceive it as organismically satisfying, when actually the 
valuing is based externally, and does not relate to the maintenance  or enhancement of the 
organism. In this way a condition of worth ‘disturbs the valuing process’ and prevents the 
person from functioning as freely and effectively as might be possible (Rogers, 1959, p. 210). 
In this statement Rogers draws on both the term conditions of worth and the term ‘valuing 
process’ and thereby the concepts of conditions of worth and processing, of which the 
valuing process plays a significant part, are linked together.  
           Thus, we can say that conditions of worth cause an incongruence between self and 
direct experience; experience which runs contrary to a person’s conditions of worth will be 
denied or distorted to allow for the maintenance of a consistent concept of self that is worthy 
of positive regard. The more ‘numerous and extensive’ the conditions of worth in a person, 
‘the greater the proportion of experience which is potentially threatening’, and ‘the greater 
the  degree of vulnerability and psychological maladjustment’ a person will experience 
5 
 
(Rogers, 1959, p. 231). As such, Rogers’s theory states that the undoing and dissolving of 
conditions of worth is both ‘the path toward psychological maturity’ and ‘the path of therapy’ 
(Rogers, 1959, p. 226). This path is followed when the person perceives the unconditional 
positive regard of the therapist, which causes the existing conditions of worth to be weakened 
and dissolved (Rogers, 1959). Through this process the person experiences an increasing 
level of unconditional positive self-regard and moves towards greater psychological maturity.  
  
Warner’s critique of Rogers’s theory of personality and conditions of worth 
            Warner (2009) writes that Rogers’s most theoretically powerful and revolutionary 
ideas were in the active and positive ways processing, self and agency operate within human 
actualization. Warner considers the human capacity and wish to process experience, hold it 
within a sense of self, and act in personally congruent ways as deeply embedded within the 
organism, and within client-centered therapy, and as such expects it to have a central position 
in Rogers’s personality theory (Warner, 2009). However, Warner also proposes Rogers’s 
personality theory diminishes the power of process and agency, giving them secondary 
placing. The self has a stronger role, yet the breadth of its independent impact on human 
actualization is obscured. This, Warner suggests, happens as a result of Rogers’s defense 
model being too rigid to explain fluid concepts that ultimately renders processing, self and 
agency as only quasi automatic in the absence of defenses. Warner hypothesizes that in 
creating a personality theory, Rogers was heavily influenced by both the push to present new 
theory in logical positivistic if then terms, and his own exposure to psychodynamic 
personality theories when training (Warner 2009). As a result, Warner claims Rogers was 
trying to fit his revolutionary ideas of actualization into more static and less process oriented 
theoretical ideas of the time (Warner 2009), and was effectively guilty of putting ‘new wine 
into old wine bottles’ (Warner, 2009, p. 117). This position echoes Gendlin’s earlier critique 
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of Rogers’s personality theory (Hart & Tomlinson, 1970). However, whilst such style of 
presentation might have influenced Rogers’s writing this critique does not explain why 
Rogers never updated the theory of personality beyond 1959. One assumes he was content 
that even in later years the theory continued to provide a satisfactory account for human 
psychological distress and functioning. 
          Further, in critiquing Rogers’s theory of defense, Warner argues that placing conditions 
of worth as the only cause of psychological maladjustment limits the theory’s capacity to 
explain experiences of complex psychological distress. For example, Warner distinguishes 
early experiences of abuse and neglect, as well as biological factors that amount to complex 
distress as some of those that cannot be explained adequately by conditions of worth. Any 
attempt to do so broadens Rogers’s theory to the point of being ‘virtually meaningless’ 
(Warner, 2009,  p. 116) and leaves person-centered practitioners seeking to explain their 
practice with complex human situations to be seen as both narrow and naive (Warner, 2009, 
p. 117). 
 
 
 
Warner's processing theory 
 In creating an alternative to Rogers’s theory, Warner has proposed a theory of 
difficult processing styles (Warner, 2005, 2006, 2008). According to Warner (2008) 
processing is what happens when ‘an individual stays with an experience which is 
troublesome or not yet clear’ (Warner, 2008, p. 5). The theory suggests that in processing an 
individual pauses and attends to the situation, stays with the experience that emerges, holding 
it in attention without judgment, sensing new, spontaneous emotional and physical feeling 
responses, along with any triggered images and memories. In staying present alongside this 
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processing of experience, the individual forms a new awareness of what is happening and 
why. The next step is for the individual to be able to hold in awareness their experience, 
whilst being able to accept that another person will have a different experience to their own, 
allowing for both realities to exist (Warner, 2008). Warner sees processing as an explanation 
for how humans make sense of experience, conceptualizing it as a core human capacity 
grounded in the biological structure of the organism. Processing capacities are developed in 
optimal early childhood relationships and later in adult relationships of a similar quality 
(Warner, 2008). As a natural human capacity, processing is aided by accepting empathic 
connection, which Warner sees as ‘the environments evolutionary adaptedness’ (Warner, 
2008, p. 119). Processing is developmentally impeded by trauma, neglect and biological 
differences, which Warner distinguishes from conditions of worth as only one of the number 
of ways processing capacities can be limited in early childhood (Warner, 2009). Using 
processing theory instead of conditions of worth, Warner offers  different processing styles, 
such as fragile, dissociative and psychotic process, as explanation of distress caused by early 
trauma, neglect and biological factors, as it represents both human’s innate capacity to 
process and the ways in which this processing can be impeded and limited (Warner, 2009). 
           Warner’s overriding argument is that Rogers’s model of defense and presentation of 
conditions of worth as the only form of maladjustment is unnecessarily limiting within the 
theory (Warner, 2009). In its place, Warner calls for an actualization-centered theory, which 
has no need of a conceptualization of defense, elevating human’s innate capacity to process 
experience to its center, working in tandem with self and agency as a complex developmental 
phenomena, and relegating conditions of worth to only one of a number of possible 
explanations for why processing experience may become difficult (Warner, 2009).  
 
A response to Warner’s processing theory 
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To replace the theory of personality and conditions of worth such a theoretical 
alternative would need to be more parsimonious, show how the original theory is incorrect, or 
as in the case of personality theory, is unable to be broadly applied to various forms of 
distress that is experienced within the person. That is, the existing theory is shown to no 
longer hold sufficient explanatory power for the observed phenomena for which it intended to 
account. In an attempt to highlight the limits of Rogers’s personality theory Warner provides 
three case scenarios that question the validity of the conditions of worth theory whilst also 
claiming that processing theory can provide a better account. In the sections below we 
challenge the claim that conditions of worth have insufficient explanatory power in relation 
to these three case scenarios and examine the extent that conditions of worth, alongside 
processing, can explain the various types of distress that Warner suggests are beyond 
Rogers’s original theory. We address each of the three scenarios framed within conditions of 
worth theory and other ideas related to Rogers’s and Standal’s personality theory that can 
account for the phenomena described in Warner’s three case scenarios.. In addition, we 
emphasize how Rogers’s original framework provides a clear symmetry between theory and 
practice, and that to replace this with a processing style theory would have significant 
implications for person-centered therapists. These implications are centrally concerning the 
impact of replacing conditions of worth theory, which is universal, with processing styles, 
which we argue is inherently diagnostic and therefore carries a requirement to tailor the 
therapeutic style to the processing style and not for the individual client.  
However, we do not disregard Warner’s processing style theory and in conclusion, we 
propose that the processing theory offered by Warner, is central to supporting the theory of 
conditions of worth and can be seen as complimentary and strengthening rather than 
contradicting or replacing the original theory. 
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Hypothetical scenario 1 
Warner states that  
‘A client has dissociative experiences as a result of having been raped as a young 
child. This situation is more difficult to conceptualize using the theory. Are we to 
consider “rape”as a “condition of worth”? Clearly it is an action that shows little 
valuing of the person. But this physical violation seems to be quite different from a 
parental value which brings withdrawal of “positive regard” when a child fails to live 
up to that value’ (2009, p. 117). 
In this first hypothetical scenario, Warner begins the critique of conditions of worth 
asking 'are we to view rape as a condition of worth?’ The simple answer is ‘no’ we are not to 
consider rape as a condition of worth; rape is a terrible and traumatic event experienced by 
the victim and so in terms of the development of conditions of worth should be treated in the 
same way as other traumatic event experiences; events themselves are not to be considered as 
conditions of worth. In this scenario the main issue is how such an event impacts functioning 
of the person. Warner’s claim is that such an event leads to a specific form of processing 
style. But can the existing personality theory, including conditions of worth, account for the 
dissociative experiences that might follow experiences of trauma such as a rape? If existing 
personality theory provides a sufficient explanation then there is no basis to the claim that 
conditions of worth theory is inadequate in this instance.  
For the purpose of the argument let us say that in the case scenario at the time of the 
rape the client is in the common state of being to some degree psychologically maladjusted. 
That is, they have to some extent already developed conditions of worth. Therefore, 
experiences that are inconsistent with the self-concept are denied and distorted by these 
conditions of worth. Whatever the unique meaning of these conditions of worth and the 
significant social-cultural relations they are related to, their very existence means experience 
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can be difficult to process and symbolization is to some extent being affected due to the effect 
of conditions of worth on the perception of reality. It is highly likely that the child’s 
organismic response to a rape would be experienced as extreme threat, to either or both the 
self-concept or physical integrity of the organism. If existing defenses fail to maintain a sense 
of consistency between organismic experience and the self-concept inclusive of their 
conditions of worth, then the child’s experience of vulnerability, violation, and threat are 
accurately symbolized in awareness. In the case of a rape, this might lead to a strong chance 
of a breakdown and disorganization in the self-structure. As a consequence of the breakdown 
and disorganization a process of reorganization ensues. The experience of rape has to be 
somehow integrated into the self-concept. As this process occurs some of this experience is 
accurately symbolized and some aspects might continue to be denied and distorted as the 
self-concept reforms a consistency. As the experience comes to be fully integrated there is no 
longer a need for denial and distortion. In the intermitting period some aspects of the 
experience of rape continue to present a threat and therefore the person experiences 
dissociative states to deny to awareness painful or traumatic memories. This is a coping 
strategy and creative adjustment to the trauma. Joseph (2004) and more recently Joseph, 
Murphy and Regel (2012) have provided a theoretical account for this process consistent with 
the person-centered personality theory. 
            The more conditions of worth that exist, the greater the person’s conditional self-
regard (Standal 1954) will be and the greater the level of vulnerability within the person’s 
self-structure can be assumed. Consequently, if the defense system works to protect the self-
structure and a total breakdown is avoided, it will remain difficult for the traumatic 
experience of rape to be fully processed. A feature of conditions of worth is they prevent 
accurate symbolization. As a result of rape the level of psychological tension will remain or 
even increase. As a client attempts to process their experience of a trauma such as rape their 
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conditions of worth are a critical part of the affective-cognitive processing system (Joseph, 
Murphy & Regel, 2012). Dissociative processing is part of, not an alternative to, attempts to 
assimilate or accommodate traumatic experience. For healthy functioning to exist following a 
traumatic event, the event itself needs to be processed and conditions of worth, as they are 
related to the processing systems of perception and defense, inevitably shape the processing 
of such an experience.  
Rape is an event and not a condition of worth but how an experience of rape is 
processed is inextricably linked to the conditions of worth that exist within the maladjusted 
self-structure of the person. As such, one person may experience a rape but have fewer 
conditions of worth affecting how they process their experiential responses, then the next 
person, whose existing conditions of worth, contribute more heavily to what makes the 
experience difficult to process. This explains why not every victim of rape will have the same 
experience in response to the event. The effectiveness of this theory in relation to trauma is 
reflected in recent research that highlights the link between levels of unconditional positive 
self-regard (UPSR) and post traumatic growth (PTG) (Flanagan et al., 2015; Murphy et al., 
2015) with higher levels of UPSR having a significant positive correlation with PTG. 
Warner suggests that rather than personality theory, processing styles offers a better 
explanation of complex distress; with ‘dissociative process’ named as a processing style 
which might explain the dissociative experience of the client in this hypothetical scenario. 
Warner states that ‘dissociative process’ usually results from physical and sexual trauma in 
young children, and describes how, in the face of overwhelming trauma, client’s may 
dissociate to avoid experiences that are too intense to process (Warner, 2008). We agree with 
this last statement but such dissociative process is part of the systems of denial and distortion 
that operate to maintain the conditions of worth that have evolved within the self-structure. 
Although offered as an alternative to conditions of worth theory, we see this explanation as 
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intrinsic to the process of denial and distortion (Rogers, 1959). Joseph (2004) provides the 
best account of how the person-centered theory can explain the process features of post-
traumatic stress disorder and post-traumatic growth (Joseph 2003, 2004, 2005) wherein 
processing is integral and not separate to the theory of conditions of worth. 
Hypothetical scenario 2 
‘A baby is left for long periods of time in an orphanage with little attention or care. 
Similarly, is abandonment or lack of care the same as a “condition of worth”?’ 
(Warner, 2009, p. 117). 
This second hypothetical scenario poses the question is abandonment and lack of care 
a condition of worth? Again the simple answer is no, abandonment and lack of care are not 
conditions of worth they are behaviors accounted for by acts of omission by a significant 
social other. However, this is not the same as saying that abandonment and lack of care have 
nothing to do with conditions of worth. Referring to the need for positive regard Rogers 
(1959, p. 223) said: 
a) Satisfaction of this need is necessarily based upon inferences regarding the 
experiential field of another 
b) It is associated with a very wide range of the individual’s experiences 
c) It is reciprocal  
d) It is potent, in that the positive regard of any social other is communicated to the 
total regard complex which the individual associates with that social other. (italics 
added) 
Rogers (1959, p. 224) went on to explain the development of self-regard ‘[A]s the 
individual comes to experience the positive regard satisfaction or frustration with any 
particular self-experience…[positive self-regard satisfactions] come to be experienced 
independently of positive regard transactions with a social other’. Now a need for self-regard 
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has been learned and because of the capacity to experience this independent of social 
interaction the individual becomes their own significant social other. 
Rogers (1959) statement above establishes the need for positive regard as a learned 
need but one that is closely associated with the basic elements of care. Similarly, Standal 
(1954) suggested that satisfaction or frustration of the need for positive regard is closely 
linked to the satisfactions of primary needs such as food, water, shelter. In light of the close 
link between satisfactions of the need for positive regard and primary needs required for 
basic care and survival, it is easy to see how the experience of a lack of care and neglect can 
lead to the acquisition of a condition of worth or will be communicated to the entire regard 
complex associated with a significant social other. In Warner’s hypothetical scenario, she 
makes it clear the baby receives ‘little attention or care’- yet what ‘little’ attention and care is 
provided will also be associated with either the ongoing satisfaction or frustration of the need 
for positive regard from the caregivers. As the infant grows and develops, the need for 
positive regard will undoubtedly be satisfied inconsistently, in response to its environment. 
Consequently, abandonment and lack of care are not conditions of worth per se, but they are 
a important feature of the environment in which positive regard need satisfactions are either 
satisfied or frustrated by a caregiver. As primary need satisfactions or frustrations are 
examples of ‘lack of care’ and ‘neglect’ it is apparent how these actions are closely linked to 
conditional positive regard and the development of conditions of worth. 
Conditions of worth will develop for the child that matches the inconsistency and 
conditionality of the positive regard of care givers. For example, the child experiences and 
comes to expect the unpredictability in provision of care, a condition of worth might be 
'Sometimes I am held when I do not demand or expect anything from anyone but sometimes I 
get punished' or ‘If I need love or affection I will get punished, I am bad’. The introjected 
values create conditions of worth that become part of a self-structure.  
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Warner uses the term ‘fragile process’ to label the impact of abandonment and lack of 
care. In Warner’s ideal developmental process, the child has their experience held in attention 
by another, so they are able to feel it as it is, regulate the intensity of the feelings, and then 
understand that other people with different experiences exist around them, without letting that 
realization diminish their own experience (Warner, 2009). Deprivation of this process in 
childhood would mean that later in life the person struggles to believe certain types of intense 
experience can exist (Warner, 2008).  
Warner suggests that Rogers’s personality theory does not account for such difficult 
and fragile process. However, Rogers (1951) offered a similar account of the importance of 
the developmental period when carers/parents help the child make sense of experience 
(Rogers, 1951). For example, Rogers (1951) provides an account of a boy who wishes to hit 
his baby brother, and describes how the denial of such experience as a result of the 
condemnation from the parent can create conditions of worth, and the alternate ideal 
developmental outcome. He suggests the ideal would involve the parent offering acceptance 
and understanding of the experience, whilst also owning their own yet different response to 
his behavior. In doing this he suggests the boy will feel the desire to hit baby brother as 
allowed to exist, and is therefore regulated in its intensity, whilst becoming aware of another 
person’s experience existing independently of their own. The similarity of Rogers’s account 
and Warner’s, in emphasizing the significance of the carer/parent role in either helping or 
hindering the individuals' processing of experience, further illustrates existing person-
centered personality theory is possible to explain the impact of abandonment and lack of care 
(lack of care may also be experience vis a vis harsh parenting) and therefore we can reject the 
claim that the theory cannot account for this form of distress. 
 
Hypothetical scenario 3 
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‘A person who has had a stroke has difficulty communicating in ways that can be 
easily understood. The stroke is a physiological event that presumably occurred 
independently from any withdrawal of “positive regard.” Are we then to assume that 
client-centered therapy is likely to be of no use to the person, since his or her 
problems don’t result from parental withdrawal of positive regard?’ (Warner, 2009, 
p. 117).  
In this final hypothetical scenario, Warner suggests Rogers’s personality theory does 
not apply to a person who experiences emotional distress as a result of a physiological event, 
rather than due to withdrawal of positive regard and therefore person-centered therapy would 
likely be not considered as helpful. However, we propose the psychological discomfort this 
person experiences can be understood through conditions of worth disrupting the processing 
of and giving meaning to the physiological changes they have undergone. This may, for 
instance, include conditions of worth around being self-sufficient or being reliant on others, 
alongside personality constructs regarding perceptions of vulnerability, death, and relational 
concepts concerning communication, and how this impacts on self in relationship. All these 
potential hypothetical conditions of worth could represent a difficulty and block the 
processing of the changes arising out of a physiological event like stroke, and in that regard 
Rogers's personality theory shows us how applicable person-centered therapy could be for 
this hypothetical client. 
Warner on the other hand sees the kind of biological deterioration offered in this final 
hypothetical scenario as a circumstance where another kind of difficult process, ‘psychotic 
process’ can emerge (Warner, 2008, p.19). This processing style accounts for experiences 
which are not common or reality based, and include experiences of voices, hallucinations, 
delusions and thought disorder (Warner, 2008). Once again, rather than, as Warner claims, 
conceptualizing psychotic process as explaining ‘complex distress’ better than conditions of 
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worth, we see it only as a continuation of the explanation offered by Rogers (1959) when 
accounting for psychotic breaks experienced by some people. Rogers states when a person 
has a ‘large or significant degree of incongruence between self and experience, and an 
experience demonstrating this incongruence occurs suddenly’ (Rogers, 1959, p. 229) then the 
process of defense can fail. This process leads to a psychotic break, where previously denied 
feelings are ‘regnant, followed by a period of disorganization and confusion, with denied 
feelings and defenses alternating in dominance’ (Rogers, 1959, p. 229). Shlien describes this 
psychotic state as an ‘impossible life to live’ (Shlien, 2003, p. 33) as the conscience forbids 
the person to live all their experience (Shlien, 2003, p. 36), and eventually both the denying 
self and the ‘self as knower’ are completely lost from a sense of reality (Shlien, 2003, p. 37). 
Rogers and Shlien’s accounts share the same sense of confusion and disorganization that 
characterizes Warner’s account of psychotic process, once more illustrating that Warner is 
elaborating on rather than offering an alternative to Rogers’s original theory. Psychosis is a 
form of symbolizing experience when the usual defense systems are unable to work to retain 
consistency in the self-structure and instead is characterized by a disorganization and 
confusion in the process of symbolization.  
Symmetry between theory and practice 
Symmetry between theory and practice is important. Warner states that, in the 
actualization oriented model, regardless of the different threats which may be encountered, ‘if 
a therapist is able to offer genuine, empathic, prizing connection to the most difficult aspects 
of a client’s experience, this is likely to alter the person’s sense of self and open the person to 
natural tendencies to process’ (Warner, 2009, p. 124). The strength of this assertion for 
guiding practice however can be seen as incoherent without a clear conceptualization of a 
defense model which illustrates the impact that relationship has on wellbeing and distress. 
The closest Warner comes to offering an explanation for the impact of the therapists’ 
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attitudes is in their capacity to ‘restart the development of processing capacities’ (Warner, 
2009, p. 120) through ‘mirroring the optimal developmental scenario between parent and 
infant’ (Warner, 2009, pp. 119-12). Warner also offers an explanation for how the therapist’s 
empathy and unconditional positive regard are capable of affecting the tendencies of process, 
self and agency both together and in isolation (Warner, 2009). Yet, without directly setting 
the empathic, unconditionally accepting attitudes of the therapist against the conditional 
attitudes of significant others, the impact of these therapist attitudes are somewhat vague and 
unexplained.  One informs the other, giving it the potency to drive change. 
            In contrast to Warner, Rogers’s personality theory clearly links theory to practice in 
first hypothesizing that the person who receives only unconditional positive regard will have 
developed no conditions of worth (Rogers, 1959) and then explains that when a maladjusted 
person perceives unconditional positive regard, their conditions of worth are weakened or 
dissolved, and they are increasingly able to offer this attitude toward themselves. This direct, 
symmetrical relationship between conditions of worth and the impact of person-centered 
therapy has been emphasized by other person-centered theorists. In rooting psychological 
maladjustment in a lack of acceptance from a significant social other, the theory is given 
'economy' and 'symmetry' by then marking the 'acceptance' of the therapist as the leading 
factor in psychological readjustment (Standal, 1954, p. V; Wilkins and Bozarth 2001). The 
person-centered therapist is effectively ‘renewing' the acceptance the individual has been 
denied, placing the attitude at the center of the theory, and illustrating a definitive theoretical 
rationale for the process of psychotherapy (Standal, 1954, p. VI). Lietaer (1984) and Mearns 
(2004) also both infer this symmetry between conditions of worth and the unconditional 
positive regard of the counsellor, in describing the latter's 'counter conditioning effect' on the 
client (Lietaer, 1984 in Mearns, 2004, p. 90). It is this effect which illustrates the 'central 
therapeutic power' of the counsellor’s accepting attitude (Mearns, 2004, p. 4). Yet Warner 
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places conditions of worth as only one of many factors that may make the emergence of 
processing more difficult (Warner, 2009, p. 124), yet still attributes the valuing attitude of the 
therapist as fundamental to the practice of the approach. Warner suggests the need for theory 
to be reworked to provide person-centered therapists with a more coherent and meaningful 
personality theory to explain their practice (Warner, 2009), and yet in this respect, the 
actualization oriented model is potentially diluting key parts of the person-centered theory for 
therapy. 
 
Implications for person-centered therapy 
           One of the major breakthroughs of person-centered therapy was the universal theory of 
psychological distress attributable to the incongruence between organismic and self-
experiences. This removed the need for diagnosis to guide specific treatment behaviors. 
Whatever the client’s problems, the therapist was always guided by respect for the client’s 
self-directiveness. However, rejection of conditions of worth and a focus on discrete 
processing styles can significantly impact contemporary person-centered practice. For 
example, the grouping of experience into different processing styles, practitioners inherently 
take a more diagnostic view of distress. Processing theory itself states that those with fragile 
process will share features of borderline and other personality disorders (Warner, 2000) 
alongside suggesting those with dissociative process are often victims of childhood sexual 
abuse (Warner, 2008). Indeed, processing styles theory suggests specific types of interactions 
which are more therapeutically effective than others when working with different processing 
styles. For example, promoting more precise forms of empathic responses for clients with 
fragile process, suggesting they need more than an accepting presence (Warner, 2000). In 
doing this, the approach istaking a step closer to becoming a specificity- diagnosis-treatment 
model of psychotherapy, which serves to confuse and diminish the fundamental and radical 
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role acceptance plays in Rogers’s work. In processing styles theory, there is also a general 
movement toward focusing on particularly ‘process rich’ elements to client’s experience 
(Warner, 2009, p. 119). This is an area of process theory that has prompted concern and 
criticism, as Warner herself acknowledges, from client-centered theorists, including Barbara 
Brodley (1990) and Jerold Bozarth (1990), who believed unconditional positive regard means 
valuing all experience rather than prioritizing one over the other (Warner, 2009).  
            As we have explored, Rogers used the presence of conditions of worth to explain how 
a person develops conditional self-regard, disrupting organismic valuing processing capacity, 
making unconditional positive regard of the person-centered therapist fundamental in raising 
of client self-regard, and the capacity to process experience. As such, unconditional positive 
regard is understood to be both the ‘curative factor’ in person centred therapy, and the ‘active 
facilitator of constructive personality change’ (Wilkins & Bozarth 2001 p vii). We suggest 
that a focus on processing styles, without appropriate appreciation of the connection between 
processing and conditions of worth,  risks diminishing the value and impact of the person-
centered therapist’s unconditional positive regard, instead placing heightened value on 
specific modes of empathic communication, and a directional focus on modifying different 
processing styles.  
 
Conclusion                We have shown how existing person-centered personality theory and 
conditions of worth can account for the different types of complex distress Warner proposes 
are beyond the theory. We have also argued that Rogers’s original theory provides an 
important symmetry between theory and practice, and  critically that a movement away from 
conditions of worth towards a selective focus on processing styles risks diminishing the value 
of unconditional positive regard in place of specific forms of empathy.  However, 
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importantly, in making these arguments, instead of suggesting a separate or distinct way of 
conceptualizing psychological distress we have highlighted the important connection between 
conditions of worth and processing styles. Our intent is not to set one against the other when 
looking at personality theory and processing, but rather to emphasize our view that the two 
are inextricably linked. We believe processing and conditions of worth are interdependent 
rather than being mutually exclusive. Conditions of worth give us a theory that allows us to 
understand the ways we develop our individual style and capacity for processing experience. 
With regards to conditions of worth the fewer or more flexible they are the more effectively 
we can process experience; the greater the number and more rigid they are the greater the 
difficulty in processing our experience. In this sense, conditions of worth provide the 
mediating function between direct experience and the self-concept. They are part of the 
process of symbolization, perception and other social cognitive processes. This includes the 
processing styles of the neglected person, the sexually abused person and the person facing 
biological deterioration. They have responses to all these discomforts, but it is conditions of 
worth which will block the capacity to process responses to these events. Our challenge to the 
person-centered community is that Warner’s processing styles theory tempts throwing the 
baby out with the bathwater, whereas we see processing styles as a useful addition to the 
theory we already have, with conditions of worth very much at its center (see Figure 1).    
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
In response to an event or aspect of an individual’s environment, there follows an 
organismic response, and the individual’s natural capacity to process this experience  
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interacts with their conditions of worth and their need for positive self regard (self concept). 
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